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A framework for advice on the 
countercyclical capital buffer 
A. Introduction 
The countercyclical capital buffer (“the buffer”) is a time-varying capital 
requirement for banks and one of the macroprudential instruments in 
Norway. The buffer was introduced following the financial crisis as a 
part of the new international recommendations for bank capital and 
liquidity regulation (Basel III)1. The recommendations have been 
implemented in EU/EEA law (CRD-IV and CRR) and in Norwegian law 
(Financial Institutions Act with regulations). 
The Ministry of Finance sets the buffer rate. Norges Bank is responsible 
for preparing a decision basis and advising the Ministry of Finance on 
the level of the buffer every quarter based on an exchange of 
information and assessments with Finanstilsynet (Financial Supervisory 
Authority of Norway). The decision basis is harmonised with the 
international regulatory framework and is published in Monetary Policy 
Report with financial stability assessment. The letters containing the 
advice on the buffer that are submitted to the Ministry of Finance are 
made available on Norges Bank’s website after the Ministry of Finance 
has published its decision on the buffer. Norges Bank provided its first 
advice on the countercyclical capital buffer in December 2013. 
In 2014, the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) issued 
recommendations on the countercyclical capital buffer framework for 
the EU and the EEA.2 The analysis of the impact of capital 
requirements is continuously evolving at a global level, and in recent 
years, a number of countries have developed their buffer frameworks. 
The aim of this paper is to provide an updated, detailed description of 
the principles and information basis for Norges Bank’s advice on the 
countercyclical capital buffer. Compared with a similar paper from 
20133, this updated paper contains a more elaborate description of the 
most important elements of the assessments on which a 
recommendation is based both when the buffer is to be built up and 
when it is to be reduced. In addition, this paper provides a more 
detailed description of the information basis that is used.  
This paper is organised as follows: Section B explains what the 
countercyclical capital buffer is and its relationship with the other capital 
requirements. Section C describes the principles that Norges Bank will 
follow when providing advice on the level of the buffer. Section D 
                                            
1 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2010a) and (2010b). 
2 See European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) (2014a).  
3 See Norges Bank (2013).  
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provides a description of the information basis used by Norges Bank in 
preparing its advice on the buffer. A more detailed review of indicators 
is provided in the Appendix. 
B. Countercyclical capital buffer – a part of 
the capital requirement for banks 
Experience shows that financial crises typically occur after a period of 
high debt growth and property price inflation. The risk of disruptions in 
the financial system that lead to significant negative economic 
consequences is referred to as systemic risk. Systemic risk is related to 
risk in the financial system as a whole. The banking system may be 
vulnerable even when individual banks in isolation are solid, for 
example, when banks have identical risk profiles and are exposed to 
each other.  
Systemic risk can be both cyclical (time-varying) and structural. Cyclical 
systemic risk increases when financial imbalances build up, normally in 
periods of strong credit growth and property price inflation. In such 
periods, both banks and borrowers often take on more risk. Structural 
systemic risk entails more persistent financial system vulnerabilities, for 
example high banking sector interconnectedness.  
The objective of the countercyclical capital buffer is to increase banking 
system resilience by ensuring that the banks build an extra capital 
buffer in good times, when systemic risk is building up.4 During a 
downturn with large bank loses, the buffer rate can be reduced to 
mitigate the risk that banks will amplify the downturn by over-tightening 
their lending to meet capital requirements.  
The countercyclical capital buffer comes in addition to the minimum 
requirement and the other buffer requirements such as the capital 
conservation buffer, the systemic risk buffer and the buffer for 
systemically important banks (Chart 1)5. Banks in breach of the total 
buffer requirement are to submit a plan for strengthening capital ratios 
and may also be subject to restrictions on dividend and bonus payouts.  
The capital buffers differ in their purpose. The capital conservation 
buffer is a fixed buffer intended to prevent capital ratios from falling 
below the minimum requirement in the event of large losses. Banks 
designated as systemically important are to maintain larger buffers 
because problems in systemically important banks can in itself have 
severe negative consequences for the economy. The buffer 
requirement for systemically important banks is to be reassessed 
                                            
4 Section 32 of Regulation No. 2111 of 19 December 2019 on capital regulation and national implementation 
of CRR/CRD IV. 
5 The buffer requirement is applied on risk-weighted assets in each bank. Banks must also satisfy an 
unweighted capital requirement to ensure that capital requirements are not too low as a result of lower risk 
weights in banks that calculate risk weights using internal models. 
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annually. The systemic risk buffer is designed to make the banking 
system more resilient to long-term, structural systemic or 
macroeconomic risks.6 Its level is to be assessed at least every other 
year. The countercyclical capital buffer is to be assessed quarterly and 
in the light of developments in cyclical systemic risk.  
Chart 1. Capital requirements for Norwegian banks. Percent.
 
All of the capital buffers strengthen banks’ solvency, but the 
countercyclical capital buffer is the only buffer that can be reduced in a 
downturn to support credit provision by design. A decision to reduce the 
buffer may enter into force immediately. However, when a decision is 
made to increase the buffer, banks shall, as a rule be given 12 months 
to adjust before the new requirement enters into force. In special cases, 
an earlier entry into force can be decided. 
The countercyclical capital buffer is the only buffer requirement that is 
also automatically applicable to foreign banks operating in Norway. This 
is called automatic reciprocity and is laid down in the Basel Committee’s 
recommendations and in the EU capital framework. Foreign banks with 
lending activities in Norway must comply with the Norwegian 
countercyclical buffer requirement for their exposures in Norway. 
Similarly, Norwegian banks with lending activities in other EEA 
countries must comply with the countercyclical buffer requirements of 
                                            
6 The EU has adopted a revised version of the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD V), which allows the 
systemic risk buffer to be used sectorally in order to address systemic risks that are related to lending to 
individual sectors. The Basel Committee, which provides international recommendations on banking 
regulation, has recently published guiding principles for the use of a sectoral countercyclical capital buffer 
(see BSBC (2019b)).   
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host countries.7 Reciprocity allows the buffer to affect a country’s entire 
lending market and contributes to a level playing field. Reciprocity is 
optional for the systemic risk buffer requirement, while the capital 
conservation buffer requirement is the same across the entire EEA 
area. 
The buffer rate will normally be between 0 and 2.5%. The buffer can 
also be set above 2.5% in special circumstances.8 Under EU/EEA 
regulations, the same considerations are used for assessing a 
countercyclical capital buffer rate over 2.5% as for assessing a buffer 
rate between 0% and 2.5%. But automatic reciprocity for countercyclical 
capital buffer only applies for rates up to and including 2.5%. When the 
buffer rate exceeds 2.5%, reciprocity is optional. The ESRB also 
recommends reciprocity for buffer rates above 2.5%.9 
C. Principles for Norges Bank’s advice on 
the countercyclical capital buffer 
Norges Bank provides advice on the countercyclical capital buffer in 
accordance with the following principles: 
Banks should build and hold a countercyclical buffer when 
financial imbalances are building up or have built up. Higher levels 
of financial imbalances increase the risk of an abrupt decline in demand 
from households and enterprises and large bank losses. Higher capital 
buffers strengthen banks’ solvency and can mitigate the risk that banks 
amplify an economic downturn by tightening lending. Moreover, a 
countercyclical capital buffer may curb high credit growth and mitigate 
the risk that financial imbalances build up further. During upturns, this 
may be a positive side effect of the buffer. 
The buffer should be activated early with signs of increasing 
financial imbalances. A build-up of financial imbalances usually 
becomes evident with a lag, and the regulation stipulates that buffer 
rate increases first enter into force after 12 months. In addition, the 
buffer can be built up in smaller increments over time when it is 
activated early. Banks should build capital buffers in good times. 
The objective of the buffer is to increase banks’ resilience in 
downturns and should not be changed frequently in an attempt to 
manage credit growth or asset prices. The countercyclical buffer is 
                                            
7 For exposures in non-EEA countries that have set their own capital buffers, the countercyclical capital 
buffer rate set by the authority of the jurisdiction in question should be recognised unless another rate has 
been set by the Norwegian Ministry of Finance. For non-EEA countries that do not have a system for setting 
a countercyclical capital buffer, the Norwegian rate applies. The Ministry initially intends to follow the 
recommendations from the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) dated 11 December 2015 on how the 
countercyclical capital buffer will be determined for exposures in countries that are not subject to the EEA 
agreement. 
8 Section 14-3, fourth paragraph, of the Financial Institutions Act. 
9 See ESRB (2014a).  
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not suitable as an instrument for fine-tuning the economy. In periods of 
persistently low loan losses and rising asset prices and credit growth, 
banks should normally hold a countercyclical buffer. The buffer rate 
should not be reduced automatically even if there are signs that 
financial imbalances are receding. The risk of a sharp downturn may 
remain elevated even if indicators for financial imbalances begin to 
recede. If financial imbalances recede significantly over time and the 
outlook for financial stability is good, a downward adjustment of the 
buffer rate may be considered. At the same time, banks should have 
sufficient capital buffers to withstand a severe downturn.  
In the event of a severe downturn and clearly reduced access to 
credit, the buffer should be lowered to increase banks’ lending 
capacity. Reducing the buffer can counteract banks’ tightening of 
lending practices and therefore improve households’ and enterprises’ 
access to credit. This may dampen an economic downturn, for example, 
when there are prospects for substantial bank losses. The buffer can be 
reduced when other capital buffers in the banking system are assessed 
to be sufficient to weather the downturn. With a reduction in the buffer 
rate, the decision basis shall contain an estimate of when Norges Bank 
will provide advice to increase the buffer again to give banks as much 
predictability as possible.10 
The countercyclical capital buffer rate shall as a rule be between 
0% and 2.5%, but can be set higher than 2.5% in exceptional 
circumstances. Exceptional circumstances are not described in detail 
in the regulation. A starting point for assessing the need for a 
countercyclical capital buffer above 2.5% is that the risk is assessed to 
be particularly high, for example, when many measures of financial 
imbalances are at high levels at the same time, and when stress tests 
and other analyses indicate that banks need higher capital buffers.  
The buffer rate must be viewed in light of banks’ adjustment to the 
overall capital requirements. The usefulness of having a large buffer 
that can be used during a downturn must be weighed against any 
potential economic costs. Other capital requirements for banks and 
banks’ capacity to meet increased buffer requirements must be 
considered when setting the countercyclical capital buffer.  
D. Information basis for the advice on the 
countercyclical capital buffer 
Advice on the level of the countercyclical capital buffer is based on a 
number of assessments – in line with the principles for the buffer 
described in Section C. Chart 2 below provides an overview of these 
assessments. Financial imbalances must be analysed to assess cyclical 
                                            
10 Section 2, final paragraph, of Decision 1 January 2020 on the decision basis and advice on the 
countercyclical capital buffer. 
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systemic risk that may trigger or amplify a pronounced downturn. 
Access to credit is analysed to assess whether there is or could be a 
need to reduce the buffer rate because creditworthy enterprises and 
households cannot access credit. Banks’ capacity to absorb losses is 
analysed to assess the level of the buffer given the assessments of 
imbalances and whether banks’ buffers are sufficient in a downturn. 
Effects of a change in the buffer requirement on banks and the 
economy must also be assessed before providing advice to change the 
buffer rate (see Box 1). 
Assessments of the four areas in Chart 2 are based on a broad range of 
indicators, models and market information. The set of indicators that 
constitute a starting point for Norges Bank’s assessments of financial 
imbalances and access to credit are described in greater detail in the 
Appendix of this paper. The set of indicators comply with the ESRB’s 
recommendations. 11 Norges Bank will analyse developments in the 
indicators and compare the current situation with historical trends and 
averages. A technical calculation of trends can be useful in analysing 
economic variables that rise over time.  
There will not be a mechanical relationship between developments in 
the indicators and Norges Bank’s advice on the buffer. In addition to 
indicators and quantitative analyses, advice on the countercyclical 
buffer is based on judgement. The set of indicators will be updated as 
access to data is expanded and new methods and indicators are 
developed. International rules and recommendations, and other 
countries’ countercyclical capital buffer frameworks contain little 
information on the assessments on which a reduction in the buffer rate 
should be based. So far, a countercyclical capital buffer rate that is 
currently in effect has been reduced only in Hong Kong.12 
Chart 2: Assessments in the advice on the countercyclical capital buffer 
 
                                            
11 See ESRB (2014a). 
12 In summer 2016, the Bank of England reversed an earlier decision to increase the countercyclical capital 
buffer in connection with the Brexit vote. The reversal took place before the increase would have entered 
into force. 
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Box I: Economic effects of a change in the countercyclical buffer 
requirement  
When a capital requirement is increased, banks can increase their capital ratio in 
two ways. They can raise more capital or they can reduce the risk-weighted assets 
that are used to calculate the capital ratio. If banks raise more capital by increasing 
lending rates to increase profits or by changing lending practices to reduce risk-
weighted assets, the economy will be affected. It will become more difficult or 
expensive for some borrowers to access credit. Effects on lending rates or lending 
practices will be minimal, if any, if banks raise capital by deciding not to distribute 
dividends or by raising new equity.  
 
If banks already have sufficient capital from before, they can leave their capital 
unchanged and, in that case, the increase in capital requirement will not have direct 
effects on the economy. In Norway, the experience has been that the largest banks 
let their capital ratios lie close to the total requirement. This implies that the capital 
requirement is binding.  
 
The introduction of and the increase in the countercyclical buffer requirement in 
Norway coincided with a build-up of capital in banks. Other capital requirements also 
increased in the period between 2013 and 2016, making it difficult to isolate the 
effect of the countercyclical capital buffer on banks’ capital accumulation. 
 
A study of banks’ adjustment to increased capital requirements up to 2014 in 
Aronsen et al. (2014) indicate that capital was largely built up by retaining profits and 
not paying out dividends to shareholders. An empirical study of Norwegian banks’ 
adjustment to new capital requirements introduced in 2013 (see Juelsrud and Wold 
(2018)) confirms that banks adjusted their capital ratios in response to the new 
capital requirements. Moreover, Juelsrud and Wold document real economic effects 
of increased capital requirements: banks reduced their risk-weighted assets, 
increased lending rates, and loans to enterprises fell relative to loans to households 
when the capital requirements were increased. Loans to enterprises are more risky 
and the risk weight is therefore higher than for household loans. The analysis in 
Galaasen and Solheim (2018) also describes a possible shift away from loans to 
enterprises as a result of an increase in the countercyclical capital buffer. Using data 
for European banks, Gropp et al. (2018) also find that banks that participated in the 
stress test conducted by the European Banking Authority (EBA) in 2011 adapted to 
higher capital requirements by reducing risk-weighted assets, not by increasing 
equity capital. Higher capital requirements then have a tightening effect on the 
economy.  
 
We can expect the opposite effect on the real economy if the capital buffer 
requirements are reduced. In the event of lower buffer requirements, banks can 
allow themselves to increase risk-weighted assets by increasing lending or 
increasing the share of lending with higher risk weights. This will affect the economy 
in that it becomes easier and perhaps less expensive to borrow. 
 
Banks may also choose not to change lending rates or lending practices, keeping 
the level of capital ratios unchanged even if the capital requirement is reduced. This 
may be because the bank expects that it will have to pay more for debt financing if it 
reduces its capital ratio as a result of an increase in risk. Another possible reason is 
that banks find it costly to adjust capital ratios upwards later if the capital 
requirement should increase again. A Danish study (see Imbierowicz et al. (2018)) 
indicates that banks tend not to reduce their capital ratios when the capital 
requirement is reduced. The results suggest that time-varying capital requirements 
have moderate effects on the economy. 
 
There is limited empirical evidence about the effect of reducing capital buffers. 
Jiménez et al. (2017) use experience from dynamic provisioning in Spain to shed 
light on the effects of time-varying capital buffers. They find that banks that had built 
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up capital in good times, and could therefore draw down these buffers in periods of 
weak profitability, were better poised to maintain credit supply during the financial 
crisis. This contributed to easing credit conditions for enterprises in a period with 
tighter access to financing. Imbierowicz et al. (2018), mentioned above, study the 
effects of both higher and lower capital requirements. They find that reduced capital 
requirements result in some increase in lending, and so not only in higher voluntary 
buffers. Arbatli and Juelsrud (forthcoming, 2020) study the effects of lower capital 
requirements as a result of the phasing in of Basel II in Norway and find that banks 
with a greater reduction in capital requirements, increased their lending more.  
 
Capital requirements and their macroeconomic effects have been the subject of 
many studies. The Basel Committee (2010c) summarises the empirical analyses of 
the impact of stronger capital requirements on GDP, credit growth and lending 
margins.1 The study points to the macroeconomic costs accruing from higher capital 
requirements as they entail higher total financing costs for banks and hence higher 
lending margins. This contributes, in turn, to reduced credit provision and lower 
output in the short term than would otherwise be the case. Akram (2014) has 
analysed the impact of higher capital requirements using a macroeconomic model 
that is estimated for Norway. Akram finds a somewhat weaker impact than the Basel 
Committee’s results. 
 
The results of the Norwegian and international studies of stronger capital 
requirements are uncertain and vary with the choice of methodology and analysis 
period. Common to many of the studies is that the impact of stronger capital 
requirements depends on how the central bank’s reaction pattern is specified. Lower 
GDP growth and inflation owing to higher capital requirements may be counteracted 
by lower policy rates. Moreover, the results depend on how fast the requirement is 
assumed to be phased in. Longer implementation times entail lower costs. Most 
studies find that the negative longer-term impact of a transition to permanently 
higher capital requirements is very small. 
 
1 See also Jacobsen et al. (2011) and Vale (2011). See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2019a), which 
provides a shorter update of the 2010 study. 
 
i. Financial imbalances  
 
The assessment of financial imbalances comprises three main 
elements: (a) pricing of risk and lending conditions; (b) real estate 
market vulnerabilities; and (c) vulnerabilities in the household and 
corporate sectors. See Appendix 1 for an overview of the indicators 
Norges Bank will use in its assessment of financial imbalances.13 
Periods with persistently high risk-taking, lower risk pricing and lenient 
lending conditions may suggest that financial market participants 
underestimate risks in the financial system.  This can lead to higher 
debt burdens and asset valuations, and therefore higher credit and 
                                            
13 The ESRB recommends that designated authorities monitor a set of variables that cover property prices, 
credit developments, external imbalances, strength of bank balance sheets, private sector debt burdens and 
potential mispricing of risk (ESRB 2014a). The ESRB also recommends that authorities monitor indicators 
derived from models combining a selection of these indicators. See ESRB (2014b) for a detailed analysis of 
indicators used in setting the countercyclical capital buffer. The Decision on the Decision Basis and Advice 
on the Countercyclical Capital Buffer states that the decision basis shall contain an overview of the 
relationship between credit and GDP and how this deviates from long-run trends, other indicators and 
Norges bank’s assessment of systemic risk that is building up or has built up over time. Together with the 
credit-to-GDP ratio, indicators for house prices relative to disposable income, commercial property prices 
and the wholesale funding ratio of Norwegian credit institutions constitute the key indicators in the first 
framework for Norges Bank’s advice on the countercyclical capital buffer (Norges Bank 2013). 
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market risk in the economy. Studies find that indicators for pricing of risk 
may signal increased vulnerability in the non-financial sector.14 
Measures of the pricing of risk might, for example, be bond market risk 
premiums and indicators of overvaluation and low volatility in the equity 
market. Lending conditions can, for example, be measured by lending 
margins and with the aid of Norges Bank’s Survey of Bank Lending and 
Finanstilsynet’s (Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway) residential 
mortgage lending survey.15 
Real estate is both an asset and collateral, and hence influences both 
economic agents’ desire to borrow and access to credit. The interaction 
between credit and asset prices may lead to a build-up of imbalances, 
and may amplify an economic downturn.16 Commercial real estate 
(CRE) is the sector with the largest bank debt, and is among the sectors 
in Norway that have historically exposed banks to the largest loan 
losses.17 Developments in residential and commercial property prices 
are important indicators for the assessment of financial imbalances. 
Both indicators have risen substantially ahead of periods of financial 
instability in Norway.  
Higher debt levels make borrowers more vulnerable to negative income 
shocks and higher interest rates. The debt-servicing capacity of 
borrowers may, for example, be assessed by examining what share of 
their incomes goes towards interest and principal payments. If debt-
servicing capacity weakens, the risk of bank loan losses increases. 
Both banks and borrowers often take on higher risk in periods with 
strong credit growth. Experience shows that strong credit growth has 
led to deeper crises.18 The ratio of credit to GDP has historically 
increased ahead of crises in both Norway19 and other countries20, and 
is recommended as a key indicator by the Basel Committee and the 
ESRB (see Box II on the Basel Committee’s buffer guide). But 
aggregate measures of credit can conceal increased vulnerability in 
credit market segments. It is therefore important to examine the 
allocation of credit, from different sources and between borrower 
groups. Information on household and corporate saving may also be 
used to shed light on whether credit developments are sustainable.21  
Norges Bank also uses model-based and composite indicators to 
assess financial imbalances (see Appendix).22   
                                            
14 See e.g. Aikman et al. (2017), Arbatli and Johansen (2017) and Danielsson, Valenzuela and Zer (2018).  
15 Note that these indicators can also be used for assessing access to credit (See Section D.ii). 
16 See eg Claessens, Kose and Terrones (2011), Drehmann, Borio and Thatsaronis (2012) and Anundsen 
et al. (2016). 
17 See Kragh-Sørensen and Solheim (2014). 
18 See Schularick and Taylor (2012), Jorda, Schularick and Taylor (2011 and 2013). 
19 See e.g. Gerdrup (2003), Riiser (2005), Anh (2011) and Gerdrup, Kvinlog and Schaanning (2013). 
20 See e.g. Borio and Drehmann (2009), Borio and Lowe (2002), Drehmann et al (2011), and Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2009).  
21 Banks’ wholesale funding share is another indicator that can shed light on whether credit growth is 
sustainable. Interpretations and possible measurement problems related to this indicator are discussed in 
Alstadheim (forthcoming, 2020) 
22 Research indicates that composite indicators combining information from a number of different indicators 
provide better signals of financial crises. (ESRB (2014b), Lang et al. (2019)). 
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ii. Access to credit 
 
Advice to adjust the buffer rate downward or lower it to zero in the event 
of an economic downturn will be based on an assessment of whether, 
owing to banks’ capital situation, banks’ credit provision is or may be a 
significant barrier to developments in the real economy. In order to 
assess this, Norges Bank must analyse the financing conditions that 
households and enterprises face or are expected to face.  
 
In this assessment, Norges Bank will use information on three main 
areas: (a) financial market stress; (b) developments in credit and credit 
practices; and (c) banks’ profitability (see Appendix 1). 
 
Measures of financial market stress, such as risk premiums, may 
provide information on tightening financial conditions and banks’ access 
to funding (see for example the description of a composite indicator for 
systemic stress in Appendix). More limited access to funding and a 
higher price for funding may impair banks’ credit provision. Historically, 
indicators of market stress have risen prior to crisis periods in Norway 
and other countries, but market signals can fluctuate sharply and must 
be interpreted with caution. 
 
Credit growth and interest spreads on loans to the non-financial sector 
are useful indicators of financing conditions faced by households and 
enterprises. Norges Bank’s Survey of Bank Lending can also provide 
useful information. 
 
Low bank profitability, primarily owing to credit losses, may prompt 
banks to reduce credit growth to ensure capital adequacy.23 Return on 
equity, the share of non-performing loans and loan losses are examples 
of useful indicators. 
 
 
                                            
23 There is little in the economic literature on identifying and analysing indicators that can be used for 
reducing the buffer rate. The ESRB recommends monitoring indicators of financial market stress, but that 
policymakers must largely rely on professional judgement in assessing when the buffer rate should be 
reduced (ESRB (2014a)). ESRB (2018) points out that market-based stress indicators should be 
supplemented by measures of credit growth and credit conditions to assess access to credit. 
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Box II: Basel Committee’s buffer guide 
The credit gap, which shows the deviation of the credit-to-GDP ratio from an 
estimated trend1, is part of the international framework for the countercyclical capital 
buffer. Historically, the credit gap has risen ahead of periods of financial instability. 
According to the international recommendations of the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, which are implemented in EU regulation, the credit gap should be 
calculated as part of the decision basis for the buffer. Using the credit gap, the 
authorities should estimate a buffer guide as a basis for assessing the level of the 
countercyclical capital buffer each quarter. However, both the Basel 
recommendations and the EU regulation emphasise that there should not be a 
mechanical relationship between the buffer guide and the level of the countercyclical 
capital buffer. Other information and the authorities’ judgement should play an 
important role.2 
In the buffer guide, there is a link between the credit gap and the buffer level: The 
size of the buffer is zero when the credit gap is below 2. For credit gaps above 2, the 
buffer increases linearly and reaches 2.5 percent when the credit gap exceeds 10. 
The thresholds of 2 and 10 are chosen based on an analysis of historical, 
international banking crises.  
Chart 3: Reference rates for the countercyclical capital buffer under alternative trend 
estimates. Percent. 1983 Q1 – 2019 Q2 
  
Chart 3 shows the buffer guide estimated for Norway using two different methods for 
the credit gap and 2.5 percent as the maximum buffer level. One of the methods 
uses a trend estimated based on a one-sided HP filter, as recommended by the 
Basel Committee. The other method is identical except that it is based on data 
augmented by a simple forecast that dampens’ the filter’s effect of giving relatively 
large weight to the latest data observations. The chart shows that the buffer guide 
would have resulted in a high countercyclical capital buffer in Norway ahead of the 
banking crisis and the financial crisis. 
The usefulness of the credit gap as an indicator for the countercyclical capital buffer 
will vary across countries and over time. The buffer guide can be suited to signalling 
a need to increase banks’ buffer capital when credit is expanding rapidly in an 
economic upturn. After a period of rapid credit growth, however, the credit gap may 
narrow even if credit growth is not low. This is because the estimated trend will be 
high owing to the period of rapid credit growth, as observed in Norway and a 
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number of other countries following the financial crisis. The buffer guide is not well 
suited as an indicator for capital buffers in banks through the entire credit cycle. 
1 The BCBS recommends estimating trend using a one-sided HP filter with lambda=400 000. Norges Bank also uses a 
trend estimated on data augmented by a simple forecast. See, for example, Norges Bank (2013) and Gerdrup, Kvinlog 
and Schaanning (2013) for further details on trend estimation.  
2 See BCBS (2010) and ESRB (2014a).   
 
iii. Banks’ capacity to absorb losses 
Banks’ capacity to absorb losses is analysed to assess whether banks 
have sufficient buffers in a downturn. That, in turn, must be assessed in 
light of the level of financial imbalances – which can trigger or amplify a 
downturn and lead to substantial bank losses. Higher imbalances may 
contribute to deeper crises. Banks should therefore hold larger capital 
buffers when imbalances are increasing.  
 
When the authorities are considering reducing the buffer rate, they must 
also assess whether banks’ remaining capital buffer will be sufficient to 
get them through the downturn. 
 
An assessment of banks’ capacity to absorb losses will be based on 
banks’ capital adequacy, earnings and loss prospects in a cyclical 
downturn, given an assessment of financial imbalances. Stress tests 
contain such information and can shed light on whether banks hold 
sufficient capital to meet a sharp downturn with large losses without 
amplifying the downturn by tightening credit conditions (see Box III).  
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Box III: Stress testing as a part of the decision basis for the 
countercyclical capital buffer 
Stress testing is used by policymakers in many countries to analyse the 
consequences for banks of a pronounced, but conceivable downturn.  
There are different kinds of stress tests. Some focus on analysing the resilience of 
individual banks in a given crisis scenario, in order to see whether they will remain 
solvent. Other analyses also include feedback effects from banks to developments 
in the real economy, so that the depth of the crisis can be endogenous. In these 
cases, the focus is more on macroeconomic outcomes and not on individual banks’ 
solvency. Modelling bank behaviour in a crisis scenario will be crucial for the results 
of this kind of macro stress test. Norges Bank uses this latter kind of stress test, and 
this kind of stress testing framework is a natural starting point for assessing the 
effects of reducing the buffer in a crisis. For Norges Bank, stress testing is a key tool 
for describing how useful it is for banks to hold a buffer capital reserve prior to a 
crisis.  
In a crisis, credit losses will typically substantially weaken banks’ CET1 capital 
ratios. In addition, the risk weights will rise owing to higher credit risk than in good 
times. Both can contribute to reducing CET1 capital ratios. 
How banks’ choose to cushion a fall in capital adequacy will be significant for the 
economic impact of the crisis in the stress test. In Norges Bank’s stress tests,1 it is 
assumed that banks will limit the decline in capital adequacy in a hypothetical crisis 
by tightening the supply of new credit in order to meet the capital requirements. It is 
assumed that banks will change their lending practices along two dimensions to 
comply with capital requirements: 1) Banks increase lending margins so that 
earnings and capital adequacy rises; 2) Banks tighten lending standards by 
increasing collateral requirements. Overall, these changes pull down credit growth, 
investment and consumption. In this way, banks’ behaviour will contribute to 
worsening the downturn in the real economy.  
On the other hand, if policymakers have introduced capital buffer requirements prior 
to losses, capital requirements can be reduced at the same time as actual capital 
adequacy falls. This may dampen the rise in lending margins and the tightening of 
lending practices, since even after credit losses, banks satisfy the new lower 
requirements. Norges Bank’s stress tests assume that banks allow capital ratios to 
fall in a crisis if capital requirements are reduced. 
As a small open economy, Norway is exposed to external shocks. Domestic 
financial imbalances that have built up may make the Norwegian economy more 
vulnerable to adverse external shocks and amplify the effects of a downturn. This 
suggests that the depth of the downturn in the stress scenario varies with measures 
of financial imbalances. If the downturn is especially deep and losses substantial, a 
greater reduction in capital requirements than otherwise may be necessary to 
cushion banks’ tightening of credit. 
A cyclical stress test that reflects developments in vulnerabilities over time may thus 
elucidate the level of the countercyclical capital buffer desirable at a given time if a 
crisis should occur (see for example the discussion in Norges Bank (2018)). 
The results of stress tests are shrouded in considerable uncertainty since they 
assess developments in a situation that rarely arises. Stress test results will vary 
from year to year, owing to both new assessments of the magnitude of financial 
imbalances and new assessments of economic relationships. 
Stress testing alone cannot provide answers to the question of what is the correct 
level of the buffer. The reason is that stress tests are not suited to studying the costs 
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associated with higher capital requirements and therefore provide no information 
about the trade-offs between the benefits of good contingency arrangements and 
the costs associated with high capital requirements. 
1 See Andersen et al. (2019) for a detailed description of Norges Bank’s model framework for macroprudential stress 
testing. 
 
iv. Effects of a change in the buffer requirement on banks 
and the economy   
 
When Norges Bank issues advice to change the buffer rate, it must also 
assess the options banks have for adjusting to such changes and the 
effects of changes in the buffer requirement on the economy.  
 
When the buffer is being increased, banks’ needs for raising capital, 
adjusting their dividend policy or increasing their earnings by raising the 
pricing of loans are assessed. This assessment may be based on 
banks’ lending growth, earnings and capital adequacy. An increase in 
the pricing of loans may be a positive side effect if credit growth is high. 
However, banks’ adjustments may also have undesirable outcomes. 
Banks may opt to raise their capital ratios by increasing the share of 
exposures with low risk weights, for example residential mortgage 
loans. This may impair enterprises’ access to financing if enterprises 
lack alternative credit sources. Norges Bank therefore monitors the 
composition of banks’ credit growth and assesses potential side effects 
of changes in the buffer requirement.   
 
With a reduction in the buffer, it is necessary to assess whether the 
reduction can be expected to have the intended effect and increase 
banks’ willingness to lend to households and enterprises. There is little 
empirical knowledge regarding the effect of lowering capital 
requirements (see Box 1). The effect of reducing the buffer may depend 
on whether banks will maintain their access to wholesale funding if they 
reduce their capital ratios. Norges Bank’s assessment of banks’ liquidity 
situation and other market information will be relevant. 
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